The global financial crisis has transformed the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced 'WashingtonConsensus'-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree of an organisation's autonomy from its members depends on the 
Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 marked a formative event for both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). The London G20 Summit in April 2009 reinvigorated the Fund as the foremost international provider of short-term liquidity, as the head of states pledged to treble its lending capacity to $750bn. By that time, the crisis had revealed first cracks in the dream of the EU as an ever-stable zone of economic prosperity. Since November 2008, when Hungary was the first country to demand balance-of-payment (BoP) assistance under a special EU facility shortly after concluding a loan arrangement with the IMF, joint crisis lending has been the order of the day. So far, five member states have followed Hungary in receiving assistance from both the EU and the IMF: Latvia, Romania, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (in chronological order, as of 30 September 2012).
The crisis has transformed not only the IMF and the EU individually but also their relationship with one another. The Fund's spectacular comeback and the EU's enormous challenges combine to create a novel setting for two organisations whose regular interactions until recently hardly exceeded the IMF's Article IV consultations with the euro area as a whole. By any standard, the IMF's main occupation with European economies is unprecedented in its almost 70-year history. Conversely, EU member states rely heavily on external funding.
Joint lending to European countries requires the approval of both the IMF Executive Board and the Economic and Financial Affairs ('Ecofin') Council.
Before that approval, 'mission teams', which comprise IMF, European Commission and, occasionally, also European Central Bank (ECB) staff members, negotiate the terms of the loan arrangements with country authorities. When Hungary, Latvia and Romania requested emergency loans in 2008-09, a puzzling constellation ensued that we, inspired by Alan Milward (1992) , name 'the European rescue of the Washington Consensus'. The 'Washington Consensus' (Williamson, 1990) has, despite various interpretations (Marangos, 2009a (Marangos, , 2009b , been associated with orthodox macroeconomic policies prescribed, among others, by the IMF (Babb, 2012: 2-7 ). Yet it was the EU, rather than the IMF, that came to the rescue of the Consensus in the latest financial crisis: Even though, in the end, the IMF Board and Ecofin approved strict loans terms, IMF staff entertained partly diverging policy proposals. The Fund, an ardent defender of macroeconomic orthodoxy up until the Asian crisis, had somewhat relaxed its orthodox stance on the 'appropriate' degree of loan conditionality; the EU, by contrast, emerged as an advocate of even more contractionary, or pro-cyclical, measures in return for loans.
This finding of a relatively more austere EU contradicts widely held assumptions about the IMF's role in the global economy. Our empirical observation also questions the strength of reputational concerns that make the Fund an enforcer of 'sound' macroeconomic policies in the first place (Broome, 2008) , but it updates Rawi Abdelal's (2007: xi) finding of 'European leadership in writing the liberal rules of global finance'. There is, moreover, a critical bias in the empirical literature when it comes to the arbitrary attribution of pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies to the -primary or sole -influence of the IMF (Cordero, 2009; Gabor, 2010) even when the EU was involved and promoted stricter loan terms. To explain this, state-centric approaches (Broz and Hawes, 2006; Gould, 2006: ch. 5; Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Thacker, 1999) would purport that those 'softer' IMF policies reflected 'national' interests or domestic preferences in relevant member states. But given that European states in both organisations expressed the same preferences, why did IMF and European Commission staff disagree on the design of policy programmes?
In this article, we address this puzzle from a moderate constructivist view of inter-and supranational organisations as bureaucracies whose staff enjoy some autonomy from their members to pursue organisational objectives (on the IMF, see, among others, Babb, 2003; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: ch. 3) . Specifically, we argue that the degree of autonomy depends on how an organisation interprets its often ambiguous mandate (see Best, 2005) . The IMF's mandate is predominantly technical, which its staff members construed as allowing them to rethink macroeconomic policies over the last decade and also in the most recent crisis. This stands in stark contrast to the more rule-based mandates of the The argument unfolds in three steps. First, we contrast the state-centric literature on crisis lending with our understanding of inter-and supranational organisations as bureaucracies. Second, we provide empirical evidence for the conflicts between the IMF and the EU over the first three joint crisis lending arrangements, all of which have expired by now.
2 These cases exemplify the IMF's greater flexibility in tackling severe economic problems in borrowing countries already before the far more contentious Greek case. Third, we explain how the interpretation of organisational mandates in the financial crisis informed the diverging policy stances held by the IMF and the EU. The conclusion summarises our findings and considers implications for the future of (joint) crisis lending.
Member state and private actor influence on crisis lending
Member states are omnipresent actors in contemporary inter-and supranational organisations. As creators of organisations ('principals'), they have delegated a number of tasks to organisational staff (their 'agents') but retain the right to decide on all relevant policy proposals (see Hawkins et al., 2006) . In this statecentric view, organisations invariably 'produce' those policies that (most of) their members prefer.
State-centric approaches culminate in the claim that member states 'call the shots' in lending decisions. This familiar contention with a respectable pedigree in IPE is rooted in two major schools of thought. One is the realist school invoking 'national interests' -read: political and economic power considerations -as the main determinants of IMF policies. It is typical for such accounts to focus on the role of the most powerful member(s) (Momani, 2004; Thacker, 1999) . The other is the liberal school, which owes much of its intellectual core to the work of Andrew Moravcsik (1993 Moravcsik ( , 1997 on European integration. Liberal analyses regard organisations as acting on the preferences of key domestic constituencies (Broz and Hawes, 2006) , or of public or private 'supplementary financiers' (Gould, 2003 . Some authors combine these two overlapping accounts to construct multi-layered explanations (Copelovitch, 2010; Oatley and Yackee, 2004; Stone, 2008 (Dyson and Quaglia, 2010: 765-766) . The Council retains the final say on these matters, but the ministers tend to accept agreements between their highrank delegates in the EFC.
At the IMF, formal decision-making rests with the Executive Board, which consists of twenty-four Directors representing either a single country or a multicountry constituency. One of their most critical tasks is to decide on temporary financing for member countries (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 48) . Voting rights correspond roughly with economic performance so that the representatives of richer members yield more influence over the entire decision-making process, including the evolution of the typical 'consensus' during Board meetings (Moschella, 2011b: 128-129) . The United States, the Fund's largest member, is vested with an effective veto power, as are the five largest EU member states (Germany, France, the U.K., Italy and Spain) combined with a voting share of more than 19 per cent. 4 Apart from Germany, France and the U.K., all European members belong to several heterogeneous multi-country constituencies (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 48 Our attention must thus turn to the workings within the organisations that 'processed' the same preferences differently.
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Accounts of inter-or supranational organisations as bureaucracies with autonomy from member states can bridge the gap between state input and organisational output. As a burgeoning body of constructivist scholarship highlights, organisations often develop a 'life of their own' after having been delegated the authority to act on behalf of their creators (Babb, 2003 (Babb, , 2007 Barnett and Coleman, 2005; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Chwieroth, 2008a Chwieroth, , 2008b Weaver, 2007 Weaver, , 2008 . In an evolutionary process, which gives them substantial autonomy, they become more than platforms for state interaction or 'transmission belts' of state preferences. As a result, different organisations 'process' the demands of their members differently.
Constructivist analyses seek to understand the pathways through which the 'social stuff' in an organisation drives policies in certain ways but not others. An organisation's mandate is an obvious starting point. The mandate broadly defines an organisation's purposes, specifies its functions and channels its activities into a certain direction while leaving enough ambiguity for departures from the established trajectory (Babb, 2003: 5-7) . Though guided by these underlying organisational rules, staff members can broaden or narrow their meaning, which is never set in stone (Best, 2012b) . Mandates create rough templates for organisational action (Babb, 2003: 17-18 ; see Broome and Seabrooke, 2007) and remain open to contextual (re-)interpretation (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 5, 22 ). The IMF's mandate, for example, has been (kept) ambiguous ever since its inception, which inspired competing policy interpretations of how to handle new or recurring ambiguities (Best, 2005 (Best, , 2012a .
Crises open even larger 'windows of opportunity' for political actors to reinterpret organisational objectives than do normal times. 8 We show how, in the latest global financial crisis, IMF and European Commission (as well as ECB) staff (re-)interpreted their organisational mandates in different ways, which in turn shaped their specific crisis lending approaches. A broader interpretation of a mandate translates into more policy flexibility in crisis lending, as the IMF's fiscal and monetary policy stance in joint lending with the EU illustrates.
Cooperation and Conflict in Joint Crisis Lending

Lending procedures
The IMF has been in the business of crisis lending for almost seven decades now.
Over time, the organisation has reformed or abandoned lending facilities, as well as creating new ones some of which pushed it far beyond its original mandate, most notably into joint poverty reduction operations with the World Bank. One facility, however, is nearly as old as the organisation itself: the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was approved by the Executive Board in 1952 and subsequently evolved as 'the principal vehicle for conditionality' (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 58) . Hungary, Latvia and Romania all concluded lending arrangements with the IMF under its SBA facility.
Not only is the SBA the IMF's oldest loan facility (Bird, 2003: 230) Differences occurred not only over procedures but also, more significantly, over policies. Borrowing countries still conclude separate loan arrangements with the IMF and the EU. These arrangements have similar formal parameters but are not identical, as Table 1 demonstrates. The conditions on the same item 10 are agreed between the IMF and the EU: as became abundantly clear during our interviews, neither side could risk being played off against the other by a prospective or actual borrowing country that tries to extract a better deal from the more accommodating lender. Substantial differences over specific policies can arise between the two lenders during (re-)negotiation or review phases. These differences have to be resolved for the two programmes to be or remain compatible. Conducting joint missions often merely brings about the needed level of compatibility between the final policy programmes. Thus, we need to distinguish between the lending policies of the two organisations and the resulting programmes that are political compromises struck between them.
[ Table 1 about here]
Comparing IMF and EU lending policies
A closer look at specific IMF and EU positions before the conclusion of an arrangement and during the programme period underlines our general observation of distinct macroeconomic approaches to joint crisis lending. More specifically, Latvia is sticking to that peg … [I]t's amazing how overriding an objective this is … that they are willing to across the board live miserably for several years to ultimately adopt the euro. … I mean, originally I thought, 'Let them euroize. Can't the ECB look the other way?' … But Latvia didn't want to do that because that would get the Europeans upset because they wouldn't actually be in the eurozone … (Interview #004: IMF country representative).
The firm stance of the leading EU bodies had sizeable social consequences in Latvia. The authorities kept the lats within the narrow unilateral band, rather than allowing it to depreciate towards the more accommodating 15 per cent threshold.
As a consequence, deep cuts in public spending were administered, including reductions of social expenditure. Indeed, IMF staff showed a preference for a longer adjustment period -potentially with unilateral euroisation -to ensure a sustained economic recovery with more evenly distributed social costs (Interview #002: IMF staff member), as well as full debt repayment.
In the case of Romania, IMF and Commission staff disagreed over how best to contain the country's fiscal deficit. The typical choice that any government faces in times of economic hardship is one between raising taxes and reducing public and estimations (Mussa and Savastano, 1999; Easterly, 2006) .
Another clarification is in order. Our preceding empirical overview shall not be read as suggesting that either the IMF's or the EU's preferences were more economically sensible. Rather, we intend to draw attention to the different understandings that IMF and Commission staff held both when programmes were launched and when they were reviewed. Aided by evidence from our interviews, we find that IMF staff advocated macroeconomic policies that were not only more flexible but also somewhat less contractionary than the EU's. While this is certainly true of fiscal policies, the evidence is more mixed in monetary policies because unilateral euroisation can be as pro-cyclical a choice for a country with a weaker domestic currency as maintaining its peg to the euro. Moreover, the IMF's new emphasis on inflation targeting has, as Daniela Gabor (2010) demonstrates, merely served to legitimise well-known orthodox monetary policies (see also Cordero, 2009 ). Overall, change in IMF policies has remained piecemeal and inconsistent in recent years (Weisbrot et al., 2009; Ortiz, Chai and Cummins, 2012; Grabel, 2011; see also IMF, 2009i) . Our analysis, therefore, does not imply that IMF policies are significantly less pro-cyclical today than they were in the past, or even that the Fund has become a stronghold of counter-cyclical economic convictions. Our more modest claim is that the IMF promoted less pro-cyclical fiscal policies in joint programmes and was generally more flexible in its macroeconomic policy advice than the EU.
Mandates as rough templates: how flexible is crisis lending?
The IMF: tackling imbalances with a policy mix
The IMF's Articles of Agreement constitute the legal framework for its macroeconomic operations. The first article encompasses six overarching organisational purposes; most notable is arguably the fifth purpose, which defines the Fund's chief role as a form of global credit union (Copelovitch, 2010: The 'neutrality' of the mandate gives IMF staff enormous interpretative latitude in deploying macroeconomic tools. Most crucially, staff enjoy relative discretion to design conditionality by defining what 'adequate safeguards' shall mean in loan arrangements. This is partly the result of an ambiguous mandate: the subject of conditionality was neither explicitly referred to in the Articles of Agreement nor codified in subsequent amendments (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 57; Babb, 2003 Babb, : 9-11, 2007 Dell, 1981) . Fund staff themselves contributed to this lack of more binding rules. Not even the introduction of the 1979 Guidelines on Conditionality, which have been revised a number of times, increased the coherence of conditionality because staff acted against the stated goal of imposing fewer conditions (Babb, 2003: 11, 24 , endnote 12).
To this day, it is staff's prerogative to initiate Executive Board proceedings.
Executive Directors consider a written staff proposal for a certain amount of funding for a member country to borrow from the IMF and the conditions for it to meet in return. Relying on their institutional experience and communication with
Directors, staff members from the responsible departments draft any such
proposal based on what they expect the Board to accept; proposals are usually endorsed by the Board. By setting the Fund's internal agenda, staff gain exceptional policy autonomy from member countries (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 50; Moschella, 2011b: 128) .
But a technical mandate alone does not make for greater policy flexibility. As is evident from the above example of staff's interpretation of the Guidelines, it needs 'policy entrepreneurs' to make sense of the operational templates derived from organisational objectives. This frequently happens during or in the wake of crises. For the IMF, the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis had such an effect. Not only was the Fund faced with specific and more general criticisms, but it also experienced an unprecedented staff reduction (Broome, 2010: 38, 43-36) . This crisis experience, as many interviewees at the IMF confirmed, set in motion a gradual rethink of the policy templates behind Fund operations. The latest global financial crisis only reinforced this process: it was perceived as just another crisis, albeit 'the worst global crisis since the 1930s' (IMF, 2009i: 3) originating in parts of the world that had long been spared of large-scale economic problems. As Manuela Moschella (2011b) documents, the Fund's crisis response built on 'lagged learning': its macroeconomic policies were 'the cumulative effects of previous policy choices' (Moschella, 2011b: 131) .
Emblematic of cumulative policy change is the Fund's conditionality reform under the 2000 'Streamlining Initiative'. In the lead-up to the Asian crisis, the IMF had advocated 'micro-conditionality', and many of the IMF-supported programmes were conceived in the same vein during that crisis. In its wake, the IMF began to ascertain the limits of loan conditionality more thoroughly (Vreeland, 2007: 24-25 Because more and more conditions, such as 'structural benchmarks' and unlike the former 'structural' or the extant 'quantitative performance criteria' (Bird, 2009: 88, Fig. 82; IEO, 2007: 4) , require no waiver from the Board in cases of noncompliance, staff enjoy additional discretion in its negotiations with country authorities (Interviews #002, #004).
Linked to the partial reform of conditionality has been the incremental overhaul and diversification of lending facilities over the past six decades (see Bird, 2003: 231-235) . This often meant larger lending volumes or easier access to funds. The latest trend since onset of the crisis has been precautionary lending.
Apart from the above-mentioned easier access to precautionary SBAs (as HAPAs), the IMF introduced in March 2009 the FCL, an instrument aimed at countries that meet the pre-set qualification criteria of 'sound' economic fundamentals ('ex-ante conditionality'). Unlike an SBA, under which disbursements are phased, the FCL permits countries to draw substantial sums at any time and even all at once. 'Qualified' countries 14 have upfront access to the resources for one or two years without being subject to any ex-post evaluations; a mid-term eligibility review is due only for two-year arrangements. In short, FCL disbursements are not conditioned on future policy implementation. In addition, the new Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) offers lending on terms tailored to the needs of countries ineligible for FCL funds. The IMF has, at times, encouraged countries to balance cost-cutting measures with targeted social spending. This new emphasis, 'social conditionality' in IMF jargon (IMF, 2008b (IMF, , 2010a , is to ensure that a basic level of social protection exists even in an economic crisis. It was in this spirit that the Hungarian, Latvian and Romanian programmes contained protective provisions for the poorest and most vulnerable societal groups (IMF, 2009c (IMF, , 2010e, 2012 . The incorporation of social concerns in policy programmes reveals a growing awareness within the Fund of the multidimensionality of economic performance: how well a country has weathered a crisis is no longer to be measured solely against monetary and fiscal achievements but also against the social effects of economic adjustments.
While the organisation's commitment to such reform might so far have proved more rhetorical than substantial, the IMF has also become much more accepting of the use of capital controls by countries in crisis (Grabel, 2011) .
Staff have been active to re-interpret the Fund's mandate in many ways since the Asian crisis. The revised policy mix with which the IMF sought to tackle country imbalances was the cumulative result of staff's many minor and major reinterpretations of its technical mandate before and during the latest crisis. While staff members' experiences as 'everyday' crisis managers shaped their view of the mandate, their re-interpretations were also grounded in some of the major analytical contributions of current IMF macroeconomic research.
Through a substantial body of economic analyses, the Research Department has disseminated more heterodox ideas within the organisation. Led by chief economist Olivier Blanchard, the department publishes widely on macroeconomic topics, in particular on how 'macroprudential' policies can be implemented.
'Rethinking macroeconomic policy' (Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia and Mauro, 2010) calls for the critical reassessment of inherited monetary, fiscal and regulatory wisdoms. Economic instability is now increasingly seen as originating at the systemic rather than the microeconomic level (De Nicolò, Favara and Ratnovski, 2012) . This thinking influences the official policy framework, as evidenced by the Fund's more systemic surveillance operations (Moschella, 2011b) . With this in mind, the department engages in dialogue with economists and practitioners to explore new solutions to economic crises (IMF, 2011b) .
The Commission and the ECB: saving the euro with orthodox measures
The organisational mandates of the European Commission and of the ECB are The ECB has a precise mandate as defined by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Bank's foremost task is to ensure price stability, but also to 'support the general economic policies in the Union' as long as compatible with the objective of price stability (Art. 127 TFEU). Given a lack of a quantitative definition, it is understood among European central bankers that price stability is achieved with an average annual inflation rate of slightly below 2 per cent (McNamara, 2006: 179-180) . This strong commitment to low inflation, underpinned by the ECB's institutional independence, symbolises a '"stability-oriented" economic paradigm that has empowered central banks' (Dyson, 2009: 8) . As a result, 'soundness' is the Holy Grail of European monetary and fiscal policy (Dyson and Quaglia, 2010: 760).
The most recent global financial crisis gave both Commission and Central Bank staff the same opportunity for re-interpreting organisational objectives as IMF staff. Even though the existing legal constraints left supranational European staff less interpretative latitude, the mandates of the Commission and the ECB were still open to re-interpretation. This re-interpretation, however, intensified monetary and fiscal orthodoxy in member states. The prevalent view in Brussels of the ballooning European sovereign debt crisis soon became that one could not go back to 'normal' -that is, the crisis had been caused (mostly) by domestic policy failures that now jeopardised European integration at large (see, for example, Rehn, 2010a Rehn, , 2011 Trichet, 2009 Trichet, , 2010 . Lacking compliance with existing rules was identified as the key obstacle to more effective crisis prevention and solution (Rehn, 2010b: 3) .
The main crisis lesson for Commission and ECB staff was to strengthen existing compliance mechanisms. Thus, they sought to reinforce financial stability in the euro area through incremental institutional changes to the governance framework (Salines, Glöckler and Truchlewski, 2012) . The Commission strives to implement pro-cyclical policies uniformly across the Union for yet another reason. Contrary to the IMF's more case-based economic assessments, the Commission must establish a 'level playing field' in crisis lending, knowing that any deviation from the principle of equal treatment would make necessary arduous political justifications. Preferential treatment might deteriorate long-term political relationships within the EU -or in the metaphorical words of one of our interviewees: 'The IMF comes when there is a fire, they work there for a while, and they fix the fire, and they leave. We have a history before and a history after this big crisis …' (Interview #006).
The ECB's main concern is the overall stability of the EMU. To this end, the ECB re-interpreted its narrow mandate in an ambiguous manner: despite, at times, intervening in currency markets to purchase sovereign bonds from troubled member states, the Central Bank supported the Commission's call for pro-cyclical policies in borrowing member states. With a sense of urgency, many supranational actors feared that ultimately nothing less than the monetary project itself was at stake. Accordingly, the ECB still exerted influence where member states outside the euro area were concerned. For example, when speculation over an end of Latvia's currency peg abounded, the ECB, though not an official part of the mission to the country, weighed in on the debate to prevent what it would have perceived as a dangerous precedent for the entire EMU (Interviews #003, #004).
In other words, the ECB has tolerated a temporary departure from its own orthodox legacy, but without encouraging member states to emulate this move with counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies at the domestic level. The current debate, also within the Bank, about the conditions for members in return for future bond purchases is further evidence of this complementary approach.
The Washington Consensus acts as a normative anchor for EU policymakers attempting to safeguard the project of European economic integration. Central to this supranational project is the euro; it continues to rest not on policy flexibility to achieve certain outputs but on the level of compliance with a narrow set of rules once decided to be meaningful criteria for the stability of the euro area. Copelovitch, 2010) , there was ample room for Fund staff to devise a more flexible crisis lending approach that, drawing on previous policies, was less pro-cyclical on fiscal issues. Commission and ECB staff certainly had less room for their re-interpretations but then chose to further constrain their autonomy for the sake of promoting more pro-cyclical macroeconomic, particularly fiscal, policies. In closing, we briefly discuss two major implications of our findings.
First, our results dispel the myth that the Washington Consensus is tied to any one institution or a certain set of institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Without empirical scrutiny of the cases that we have discussed, one might be left with the fallacious impression that the IMF once again embraced fiscal orthodoxy for borrowing countries when it did so less than the EU. In this sense, the future trajectory of the Consensus is uncertain (Babb, 2012 have preferred 'a slightly higher deficit target to limit the procyclicality of fiscal policy'.
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It is important to note that deficit figures can belie actual fiscal policies. A simultaneous GDP contraction that exceeds the amount of spending cuts (in real terms) produces a larger deficit, which is not the same as enacting counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Moreover, the IMF's flexibility in revising initial deficit targets is amplified by its (over-)optimistic growth forecasts (Gabor, 2010: 822-823) . We thank one reviewer for clarifying these related points.
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Exempted were 'pensions and allowances for those accompanying handicapped people with a first degree handicap' (EU, 2010: 6).
14 To date, Colombia, Mexico and Poland have subscribed to the FCL.
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The PLL was launched in November 2011 as a replacement of the similarly designed Precautionary
Credit Line (PCL), which had been in existence for just over a year (IMF, 2010b (IMF, , 2011a .
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The loan arrangements with Hungary and Latvia were concluded (under the Emergency Finance Mechanism for 'rapid assistance') before the decision on access limits. Deficit targets and revisions are represented on an accrual basis in ESA95 (European System of Accountants)
Tables
terms. A revision that was 'undone' through a subsequent one is in round brackets.
* Where explicitly stated in an alternative 'programme scenario'. For these figures, the IMF (2009f: 25, fn. 6, 67, Tab. 1) employs a cash deficit concept. As its use tends to yield slightly stricter -that is, lower -targets than ESA-based calculations, numerical deviations in the agreed targets for the same borrowing country are due to the choice of methodology. That the original document on the Hungarian SBA, as well as the country's LoI, mentions a target of 2.5 % on an ESA basis was apparently a typing error, which was corrected with the first review.
Sources: Data compiled from various programme documents by the IMF (LoIs; requests for SBAs and reviews) and the EU ((Supplemental) Memoranda of Understanding). Tables 1 and 2 above) ; authors' interviews.
